“The advisability of getting its crews into the United Kingdom outweighed the desirability of more thorough training before departure. But this meant that crews arrived with little or no experience in high-altitude flying. Pilots and co-pilots had received little instruction in flying formations at any altitude, to say nothing of maintaining tight formations at the extreme altitudes planned for day bomber missions. Many of the radio operators could neither send nor receive the Morse code. Worse yet, the gunners proved to be almost completely unfamiliar with their equipment. Many of them had had little or no opportunity to shoot at aerial targets, and several had never operated a turret in the air. This deficiency was especially disturbing to the Eighth Air Force experts because they felt sure that the ability of the heavy bombers to destroy enemy targets by daylight without prohibitive loss would depend in large part on their ability to defend themselves against enemy fighters.” – Arthur B. Ferguson, “Rouen-Sotteville No. 1, 17 August 1942” (from James Lea Cate and Wesley Frank Craven, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. One, Plans and Early Operations)